Submission Title

Virtue and Democracy

Session Number

SS8B

Location

Weyerhaeuser 304

Abstract Number

SS8B-g

Abstract

One would puzzle in contemporary democracy over what would be meant by ascribing the word “virtue” to a societal political body or electorate; we often do not even consider it material to associate the word virtue with the functional value of a political system. This confusion needs clarity.

I argue thus that our common notion of the word “virtue” needs a refresher of ancient nostalgia, for we stand to harmonize a discord in our values by its noble etymology. We ought then to take our retrospect no further than Aristotle, for his “arete” is the definition of which we are deficient, and for Aristotle, arete meant something of a more visceral function. This functioning was an ascription necessary for his political body. If we are to shed the tyranny of our present lexicon, I reason we may find a way to aptly understand why we ought to aim at a virtuous political body.

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Apr 23rd, 3:15 PM Apr 23rd, 4:45 PM

Virtue and Democracy

Weyerhaeuser 304

One would puzzle in contemporary democracy over what would be meant by ascribing the word “virtue” to a societal political body or electorate; we often do not even consider it material to associate the word virtue with the functional value of a political system. This confusion needs clarity.

I argue thus that our common notion of the word “virtue” needs a refresher of ancient nostalgia, for we stand to harmonize a discord in our values by its noble etymology. We ought then to take our retrospect no further than Aristotle, for his “arete” is the definition of which we are deficient, and for Aristotle, arete meant something of a more visceral function. This functioning was an ascription necessary for his political body. If we are to shed the tyranny of our present lexicon, I reason we may find a way to aptly understand why we ought to aim at a virtuous political body.