Virtue and Democracy
Faculty Sponsor
Christopher Kirby, Eastern Washington University
Research Project Abstract
One would puzzle in contemporary democracy over what would be meant by ascribing the word “virtue” to a societal political body or electorate; we often do not even consider it material to associate the word virtue with the functional value of a political system. This confusion needs clarity.
I argue thus that our common notion of the word “virtue” needs a refresher of ancient nostalgia, for we stand to harmonize a discord in our values by its noble etymology. We ought then to take our retrospect no further than Aristotle, for his “arete” is the definition of which we are deficient, and for Aristotle, arete meant something of a more visceral function. This functioning was an ascription necessary for his political body. If we are to shed the tyranny of our present lexicon, I reason we may find a way to aptly understand why we ought to aim at a virtuous political body.
Session Number
SS8B
Location
Weyerhaeuser 304
Abstract Number
SS8B-g
Virtue and Democracy
Weyerhaeuser 304
One would puzzle in contemporary democracy over what would be meant by ascribing the word “virtue” to a societal political body or electorate; we often do not even consider it material to associate the word virtue with the functional value of a political system. This confusion needs clarity.
I argue thus that our common notion of the word “virtue” needs a refresher of ancient nostalgia, for we stand to harmonize a discord in our values by its noble etymology. We ought then to take our retrospect no further than Aristotle, for his “arete” is the definition of which we are deficient, and for Aristotle, arete meant something of a more visceral function. This functioning was an ascription necessary for his political body. If we are to shed the tyranny of our present lexicon, I reason we may find a way to aptly understand why we ought to aim at a virtuous political body.
